Istanbul, Turkey, 30 April 2025—IFC has announced a new investment to support the long-term refinancing of the modernisation and expansion project at Antalya Airport, Turkey’s second-largest airport in terms of international passenger traffic.

 

The airport’s expansion, alongside capacity increases and service improvements, is strengthening the country’s tourism sector and promoting economic growth.

 

The POTAS Antalya aviation refuelling facility, located at Antalya Airport, which has commenced operations in Antalya, is funded by a loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group.

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Özlem Academy Education and Consultancy Inc. Project:

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1️⃣ QRA – Quantitative Risk Assessment

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A QRA analysis was conducted to quantitatively assess risks related to process safety across the entire facility.

Within this scope:

• HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study): Hazard scenarios were systematically analysed on process flow diagrams.

• LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis): The adequacy of critical protection layers and independent safety functions was determined.

• SIL (Safety Integrity Level) Analysis: Target safety levels for safety-instrumented systems were calculated.

• FTA (Fault Tree Analysis): The pathways leading to hazardous events were broken down to their root causes.

• ETA (Event Tree Analysis): Probability chains for post-event scenarios have been modelled.

Using the data obtained, individual risk and societal risk curves were created to assess the facility’s compliance with internationally recognised criteria (e.g. UK HSE Tolerability Criteria).

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2️⃣ FERA – Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

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The FERA study modelled potential fire, explosion and toxic release scenarios across the entire facility.

In these analyses:

• Critical equipment areas (storage tanks, process lines, loading areas) were examined,

• Flame spread, radiation effects, explosion pressure and heat effect distances were calculated,

• Emergency scenarios and impact radii were determined.

The results formed the basis for fire and explosion resistance criteria, escape route planning and the design of protective measures.

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3️⃣ EERA – Emergency Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)

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The EERA study examined the facility’s emergency management capacity in detail:

• Escape routes and assembly areas were analysed based on the facility plans.

• Safe evacuation routes were established by taking into account radiation, heat flux and toxic concentration maps.

• Emergency response teams and response times were assessed according to international performance criteria. This analysis contributed to the optimisation of the facility’s EER (Escape, Evacuation and Rescue) strategies.

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4️⃣ Explosion Protection Document (EPD)

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In accordance with ATEX 99/92/EC and EN 60079-10-1 / EN 60079-14 standards, an Explosion Protection Document has been prepared for the facility.

Within this scope:

• Hazardous areas (Zone 0, 1, 2 / 20, 21, 22) have been classified.

• Potential ignition sources have been identified and control measures defined.

• The selection of explosion-proof equipment, ventilation design and dust accumulation prevention measures have been determined.

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5️⃣ Steps Undertaken for a High-Risk Establishment Under the BEKRA / SEVESO Framework

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Due to the use of flammable chemicals such as JET A1 and AVGAS in the POTAS Antalya terminal process, the facility has been classified as a high-risk establishment under the BEKRA Regulation (Regulation on the Control of Major Industrial Accident Hazards).

 

In this context, Özlem Academy has carried out the following steps to ensure full compliance with the requirements of the Seveso III Directive (2012/18/EU):

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Hazardous Substance Inventory and Summation Rule Calculations

• All hazardous substances present in processes, storage areas and auxiliary units have been identified according to their CAS numbers and CLP/GHS classifications.

• In accordance with BEKRA Annex 1, lower and upper threshold values have been analysed for each substance.

• The facility’s high-risk status has been verified by applying the summation rule (∑ qᵢ / Qᵢ ≥ 1) for substances belonging to the same hazard category.

• This analysis has been linked to the QRA modelling to quantitatively validate the overall risk profile.

 

Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation:

As required for a high-level organisation, the SMS components defined in Annex 3 of the BEKRA Regulation have been structured at the facility level:

• Organisational structure and responsibilities

• Operational procedures and safe working instructions

• Change management (MOC)

• Training, competence and awareness plan

• Process safety performance indicators (PSPI)

• Emergency planning, integration of internal and external response

• Audit and improvement cycle (Plan–Do–Check–Act)

This system has been designed to operate in an integrated manner with the ISO 45001 and ISO 14001 management systems.

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Preparation of the Safety Report:

In accordance with the obligations of the top-level organisation, a Safety Report has been prepared in accordance with the BEKRA Annex 2 format.

Within this scope:

• The general layout of the facility, process descriptions, chemical inventory and safety systems have been documented.

• Major accident scenarios, probability calculations and impact analyses (including QRA and FERA outputs) have been integrated into the report format.

• Impacts on the community, environmental consequences and emergency response plans have been detailed.

• The entire report has been aligned with the IFC–FMO–Proparco environmental and social requirements (Performance Standards 1–4).

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Major Accident Scenario Report:

In accordance with Annex 2 / Section B of the BEKRA Regulation, the Major Accident Scenario Report is one of the core components of the Safety Report prepared for high-risk facilities.

This report systematically assesses the causes, impacts and control measures of serious accidents that could occur in the plant’s process and storage units.

Major accident scenarios have been developed based on event chains derived from the HAZOP, LOPA, FTA and ETA analyses conducted.

The identification process was carried out in the following steps:

1. Identification of hazardous equipment: Conducting Vade Mecum, DOE F&EI and ICI MOND analyses

2. Identification of critical hazard sources: Storage tanks, pump stations, tanker loading areas, etc. Conducting HAZOP, LOPA, SIL, CCF and SPAR-H analyses

3. Definition of initiating events: Factors such as leaks, equipment failure, human error, and control system failure.

4. Modelling of protection layers and failure probabilities (Independent Protection Layers).

5. Probability and consequence calculations: The likelihood of each scenario occurring and the magnitude of its consequences have been quantitatively assessed. (FTA and ETA analysis)

 

Internal Emergency Plan:

• Internal Emergency Plan (IEP): Prepared taking into account the coordination of site personnel, equipment and response vehicles, based on the results of the EERA analysis.

• External Emergency Plan (EEP): This has been developed to be compatible with local authorities (Municipality, Fire Service, AFAD and equivalent Environmental Directorate bodies), and drill scenarios have been proposed.

• The plans model escape routes, assembly points, the communication chain and response times.

 

Public Information and BEKRA Notifications:

• In accordance with Article 11 of the BEKRA Regulation, a public information document has been prepared for residents living in the vicinity of the facility.

• A draft information page that can be integrated into the facility’s website and notification files for the competent authorities have been created.

• The information content explains the types of potential accidents, the measures taken, and the procedures to be followed in an emergency.